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I. Introduction
The most recent election cycle ended in a morass of pandemic woes, maladroit
ballot counting, and a flummoxed American public.1 With many believing the

* J.D. Candidate, University of Wyoming College of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to
thank Professor George Mocsary for being my introduction into this emerging field of blockchain
and the law, and for supporting my endeavors in making this Comment a reality. Further, I would
like to offer my sincere gratitude to Matt Kaufman and Chris Land for their guidance with both
the technology and the regulation of blockchain. Finally, I would like to thank all those who
entertained my newfound interest and assisted in editing this Comment, especially Amina Malik
and Taylor Means.
1
Ann Gerhart, Election Results Under Attack: Here are the Facts, Wash. Post (Jan. 4, 2020,
11:12 AM), www.washingtonpost.com/elections/interactive/2020/election-integrity/; Jeff Amy et
al., Trump, on Tape, Presses Ga. Official to ‘Find’ Him Votes, AP News (Jan. 4, 2020), apnews.com/
article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-georgia-elections-a7b4aa4d8ce3bf52301ddbe620c6
bff6 (discussing Donald Trump’s attack on the ballot-counting in Georgia after election officials
had already counted votes three times); Domenico Montanaro, Poll: Just A Quarter Of Republicans
Accept Election Outcome, NPR (Dec. 9, 2020, 12:00 PM), www.npr.org/2020/12/09/944385798/
poll-just-a-quarter-of-republicans-accept-election-outcome [https://perma.cc/5XV8-CW33].

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2021

1

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 21 [2021], No. 2, Art. 7

412

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 21

importance of voting to be at an all-time high,2 voter turnout—through one
method or another—reached record numbers.3 Intrinsically tied to the pandemic,
this included a record number of voters casting their ballots by means other than
in person.4
This influx of mailed-in ballots caused substantial and unprecedented delay
in the counting and reporting of ballots.5 This only served to further stoke
the agitated masses.6 Although certainly not a new topic,7 this began a newly
impassioned discussion promoting digital voting.8 While many have advocated
for and imagined a web portal 9 or biometrically secured technique,10 a better
option may be hiding in plain sight.11
Although viewed by some as little more than a buzzword,12 discussion and use
of blockchain technology has quickly gained traction.13 While generally tied to

John Gramlich, 20 Striking findings from 2020, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Dec. 11, 2020), www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/12/11/20-striking-findings-from-2020/ [https://perma.cc/
Y7US-9S58] (analyzing a study reporting that eight-in-ten registered voters stated that this election
“really mattered,” which was the highest level since at least 2000); see also Laura Bliss & Sarah Holder,
Nevada, What Took So Long?, Bloomberg CityLab (Nov. 11, 2020, 11:25 AM), www.bloomberg.
com/news/articles/2020-11-11/why-counting-the-2020-ballots-is-taking-so-long [https://perma.
cc/D2N5-333G].
2

Domenico Montanaro, President-Elect Joe Biden Hits 80 Million Votes in Year of Record
Turnout, NPR (Nov. 25, 2020, 9:06 AM), www.npr.org/2020/11/25/937248659/president-electbiden-hits-80-million-votes-in-year-of-record-turnout [https://perma.cc/86TG-NFCS].
3

4

Id.

See Understanding Election Results, Vote.org (Dec. 16, 2020), www.vote.org/electionresults/ [https://perma.cc/3SMV-QL84].
5

6

Bliss & Holder, supra note 2.

See, e.g., Kimberly C. Delk, What Will It Take to Produce Greater American Voter Participa
tion? Does Anyone Really Know?, 2 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 133, 167 (2001); R. Michael Alvarez &
Jonathan Nagler, The Likely Consequences of Internet Voting for Political Representation, 34 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 1115, 1117– 20 (2001).
7

8
Blockchain Voting Debate Heats Up After Historic Election, Gov’t Tech. (Nov. 20, 2020),
www.govtech.com/products/Blockchain-Voting-Debate-Heats-Up-After-Historic-Election.html
[https://perma.cc/9ZFF-RMN9].

Michelle Mount, Innovations in Internet Voting Systems, 4 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 699, 701
(2020) (revealing that, at least in the case of overseas military voters, a number of states accept
absentee ballots via email, and others utilize a web-based portal).
9

10

See Voatz, voatz.com/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) [https://perma.cc/267Y-MG9U].

11

See infra notes 159–289 and accompanying text.

Parmy Olson, A Two-Minute Guide to Blockchain, Forbes (Dec. 4, 2018, 7:01 AM), www.
forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2018/12/04/a-two-minute-guide-to-blockchain/?sh=64a59fbd79c8.
12

Steve McNew et al., Blockchain Solutions: Practical B2B Supply Chain Applications, JD
Supra (Nov. 20, 2020), www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/blockchain-solutions-practical-b2b-68335/
[https://perma.cc/CP8B-AJP9].
13
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cryptocurrency and fintech14—and rightfully so15—discussion of the underlying
technology has become essentially mainstream.16 While the discourse has yet to
become voting-centric, advocates have pushed for the technology to be used in
bettering proxy and other shareholder voting.17
Implementing a transparent,18 secure,19 and faster 20 manner of casting
and counting votes seems to be the only option in avoiding a repeat of what
will surely come to be known as one of the most tumultuous voting cycles in
history.21 A blockchain-supported voting system presents promise of voting in the
digital age—and has begun to make a track record of just that.22 Although these
initial “pilots” of blockchain-enabled systems have been less than perfect from a
variety of standpoints, these brave pioneers have provided those who follow
with an idea of what to expect.23 These domestic groundbreakers—the city of
Denver, Utah County, Utah, the state of West Virginia and others—have relied
on a private company to provide this exciting opportunity to some voters in

14
See id. For more on cryptocurrency, see How Do Ethereum Smart Contracts Work?,
CoinDesk (Dec. 30, 2020, 7:48 AM), www.coindesk.com/learn/ethereum-101/ethereum-smartcontracts-work [https://perma.cc/7MFG-FHD8].
15
MK Manoylov, Nearly $900 Million in VC Went to Crypto Companies in the Third
Quarter of 2020, Block (Oct. 18, 2020, 11:03 AM), www.theblockcrypto.com/linked/81492/
nearly-900-million-in-vc-went-to-crypto-companies-in-the-third-quarter-of-2020 [https://perma.
cc/2KL6-HNPP].

See Rachel Wolfson, Bitcoin and Blockchain Topics to Discuss with the Crypto Curious this
Thanksgiving, Cointelegraph (Nov. 26, 2020), cointelegraph.com/news/bitcoin-and-blockchaintopics-to-discuss-with-the-crypto-curious-this-thanksgiving [https://perma.cc/MD8Q-46XJ].
16

17
See Spencer J. Nord, Blockchain Plumbing: A Potential Solution for Shareholder Voting?,
21 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 706, 723–27, 731–34 (2019); eVoting Technology is the Blockchain-enabled
Electronic Voting Solution for Capital Markets and Beyond, NASDAQ, www.nasdaq.com/solutions/
evoting-technology (last visited Apr. 19, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8XTT-9SMF].

See generally Primavera De Filippi & Aaron Wright, Blockchain and the Law: The
Rule of Code 37–38 (2018).
18

19

Id.

20

Id.

See James Oliphant, U.S. Election Year Shaped by Pandemic and Trump’s Defiance, Reuters
(Dec. 10, 2020, 5:17 AM), www.reuters.com/article/global-poy-usa-election/u-s-election-yearshaped-by-pandemic-and-trumps-defiance-idUSKBN28K1FU [https://perma.cc/HB2Z-SEBJ].
21

22

Voatz, supra note 10.

Michael A. Specter et al., The Ballot is Busted Before the Blockchain: A Security Analysis of
Voatz, the First Internet Voting Application Used in U.S. Federal Elections, MIT (2020), internetpolicy.
mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SecurityAnalysisOfVoatz_Public.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B25W-5RG8]; see, e.g., Greg Magarshak, In Defense of Blockchain Voting, Coindesk (Mar. 12,
2020, 10:13 AM), www.coindesk.com/in-defense-of-blockchain-voting [https://perma.cc/TD8TLBWE]; Rachel Wolfson, Blockchain Voting Systems Could Be the Future, but Current Flaws Persist,
Cointelegraph (Apr. 16, 2020), cointelegraph.com/news/blockchain-voting-systems-could-bethe-future-but-current-flaws-persist [https://perma.cc/5EDT-48UE].
23
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the twenty-first century.24 Somewhat antithetical to what one may imagine for
governmental voting 25—yet also in line with what is currently being utilized 26—
this Comment envisions a system provided by the government, initially pioneered
by the “Wild West of Blockchain,”27 Wyoming.
States have a broad amount of authority in how they provide and run
elections.28 While required to meet certain minimum requirements, the federal
government has left states with an open door to explore polling options.29 A
government-provided blockchain would comply with these requirements to an
even greater tune than the current system.30 While some hold concerns over
the security and privacy inherently necessary in the American polling place,31 a
properly developed and implemented system would overcome these concerns.32
Wyoming permits each voter to vote with an absentee ballot.33 The State
likewise has charged each citizen with a duty to assist absentee voters.34 A
blockchain-enabled voting system may be the most viable option for truly fulfilling
these edicts. Bringing voting systems into the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”35
will continue to ensure the integrity of voting in the great state of Wyoming.
24

See Voatz, supra note 10.

See Lawrence Norden & Alan Beard, There Is Shockingly Little Oversight of Private
Companies that Create Voting Technologies, Brennan Ctr. for Just. (Mar. 6, 2020), www.
brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/there-shockingly-little-oversight-private-companiescreate-voting [https://perma.cc/8XRW-WFCL] (discussing both the lack of oversight election
system’s vendors are under and the surprising reality that private technology companies are so
central to American elections).
25

Wyoming Chooses ES&S Paper-Based Technology, Election Sys. & Software (Mar. 11,
2020), www.essvote.com/blog/our-customers/wyoming-chooses-ess-voting-machines/ [https://
perma.cc/W5JC-28FF] (highlighting a local example of a privately developed election system being
utilized for elections).
26

27
Nolle Acheson, Crypto Long & Short: Wyoming Is Crypto’s ‘Wild West,’ Which Is Exactly What
We Need, CoinDesk (Nov. 2, 2020, 9:10 AM), www.coindesk.com/crypto-regulation-custodywild-west [https://perma.cc/9Q54-3HVJ].
28
Jane Susskind, Decrypting Democracy: Incentivizing Blockchain Voting Technology for an
Improved Election System, 54 San Diego L. Rev. 785, 806 – 09 (2017).
29

Id.

30

See id.

Specter et al., supra note 23, at 1–3, 14; see generally Barbara Simons, Why Internet Voting Is
Dangerous, 4 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 543 (2020).
31

32

Susskind, supra note 28, at 806 – 09, 810–11.

33

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-9-102 (2021).

Id. § 22-9-101 (charging Wyoming’s citizens – among others – with a duty to assist election
officials and absentee voters).
34

35
J. P. Schmidt & Tung Chan, The Future Infrastructure of Business: A Primer on Blockchain
and the Evolving Regulations, Haw. B.J., Apr. 2020, at 13; Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial
Revolution: What it Means, How to Respond, World Econ. F. (Jan. 14, 2016), www.weforum.org/
agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond/ [https://
perma.cc/834A-P956].

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol21/iss2/7

4

Beckett: Blockchain Voting: WY Not?

2021

Comment

415

Part II introduces how blockchain technology functions—at a novice level—
and the technology’s importance to Wyoming.36 Part III provides an overview
of the federal and state requirements for implementing a new voting system.37
Part IV introduces current and future blockchain voting measures 38 while Part
V analyzes such a system under current requirements from Part III.39 Part VI
advocates for a proposal to be taken to implement a blockchain-enabled system,40
and Part VII concludes by promoting access to democracy through a blockchainenabled system.41

II. Background
A. What Is Blockchain?
Blockchain is more than just a buzzword.42 Blockchain technology underlies
many cutting-edge technologies, such as cryptocurrency,43 supply-chain
management,44 and smart-contracts.45 Although originally introduced as a
means of performing pseudonymous transactions through cryptocurrency,46 the
technology was intended to decentralize transactions generally and function as
a trustless medium for users worldwide to engage with each other.47 Decentralized platforms drastically reduce multiple security risks inherent in other
systems by removing the central point of attack that central servers are inherently
flawed by.48

36

See infra notes 42–85 and accompanying text.

37

See infra notes 86–158 and accompanying text.

38

See infra notes 159–255 and accompanying text.

39

See infra notes 256– 90 and accompanying text.

40

See infra notes 291– 96 and accompanying text.

41

See infra notes 297–301 and accompanying text.

42

Olson, supra note 12.

Bitcoin, bitcoin.org/en/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9P82-UKEF];
Welcome to Ethereum, Ethereum, ethereum.org/en/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) [https://perma.
cc/5EKN-LLNV].
43

44
Kari Korpela et al., Digital Supply Chain Transformation toward Blockchain Integration,
Proc. of the 50th Haw. Int’l Conf. on Sys. Scis. passim (2017), 128.171.57.22/bitstream/
10125/41666/1/paper0517.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZFC-NNG5].
45

How Do Ethereum Smart Contracts Work?, supra note 14.

See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 1– 8
(2008), bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8DQ-56B4]. The original white paper only
discussed the level of privacy as anonymous, but also included certain concessions noting the
potential for others to discover a user’s identity in a similar way that one would on the traditional
stock market. See id. at 6.
46

47

Id.

See generally id.; Les Wilkinson & Curtis Capeling, How to Understand Blockchain,
ACC Docket, Sept. 2018, at 66, 68, www.accdigitaldocket.com/accdocket/september_2018/
48
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Although technologically quite complex, at their heart, blockchain systems
operate by verifying transactions across a peer-to-peer network of “nodes” to
ensure the integrity of each and every transaction.49 Therefore, in the broadest
sense, each transaction is verified by a simple majority of the nodes on the
blockchain, which is often expressed as consensus.50 Consensus is reached when
the proposed transactions in a new “block” match across the majority of nodes.51
The new block is verified and added onto the existing blocks—creating a chain.52
Each new block must reference the “hash” (a unique fingerprint) of the previous
block in the chain, which is how the verifying nodes authenticate the proposed
transactions.53 This decentralized approval process creates a chronologically
oriented series of blocks that are each linked together though cryptographic
signatures and timestamps.54 This nonrepudiability is the backbone of the security
of blockchain technology.55 The highly tamper-resistant system would require
tremendous effort to manipulate.56
Generally, blockchains also provide a lookback mechanism—a distributed
ledger—that allows each user to audit every transaction that has occurred on
the blockchain.57 This legitimization provides a sense of trust in the trustless
environment of digital transactions.58 This transparent system is maintained on
each device that utilizes the blockchain—which provides for an impressive amount
of backup.59 Each user may audit the entire history of the system, checking that
each recorded transaction is authentic.60 Many debate whether such transparency
is useful or even possible in the realm of voting, but others recognize that this
system offers many benefits.61

MobilePagedArticle.action?articleId=1418609#articleId1418609 [https://perma.cc/V5VD-X25G];
Joseph J. Bambara & Paul R. Allen, Blockchain: A Practical Guide to Developing Business,
Law, and Technology Solutions 228–31 (Lisa McClain et al. eds., 2018).
49

Bambara & Allen, supra note 48, at 6.

50

Id. at 16–18, 48–49.

51

Id.

52

De Filippi & Wright, supra note 18, at 22–26.

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Bambara & Allen, supra note 48, at 1, 4–6.

60

De Filippi & Wright, supra note 18, at 22–26.

Susskind, supra note 28, at 794–95, 806–08 (addressing the ability for voters to verify their
vote during and after casting their own ballot, and independently verify vote counts otherwise).
61
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Another aspect of blockchain technology that lends itself useful for
implementation as a voting system is the ability to tally records.62 With self-tallying
voting already being implemented in the shareholder-voting realm, such a benefit
could reduce vote counting errors in political elections as well.63 A blockchainenabled voting system would be able to operate without administration from a
central party, thus relieving concerns of mishandling votes.64
However, with all great technology comes great legal questions.65 Courts
have yet to decide on how blockchain-enabled systems fit within current laws.66
However, some emerging trends shed light on how the digital environment of
blockchain-enabled systems may be treated in brick-and-mortar courthouses.67
This new territory presents lawmakers with exciting opportunities. Lawmakers
in Wyoming have already made significant strides in becoming the “Wild West
of Blockchain.”68

B. Blockchain Is Already Prominent in and Promising to WY
Becoming an early adopter of newly dreamt up legal frameworks is
nothing new to Wyoming.69 Furthering this reputation, Wyoming has enacted a
multitude of blockchain-related pieces of legislation.70 Through this, Wyoming has
quickly become a leading force in the regulation of blockchain-based industries.71
Wyoming became the first state to enact legislation both enabling banks to custody
tokens and allowing initial coin offerings.72 Structuring legislation and regulations

62

See Nord, supra note 17, at 725, 732–33.

63

Id.

64

Id.

See generally Jeremy A. Carp, Autonomous Vehicles: Problems and Principles for Future
Regulation, 4 U. Pa. J.L. & Pub. Affs. 81 (2018); Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The
Law’s Race to Keep Up with Technological Change, 2007 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 239.
65

66
See Morgan N. Temte, Comment, Blockchain Challenges Traditional Contract Law: Just
How Smart Are Smart Contracts?, 19 Wyo. L. Rev. 87 (2019); see De Filippi & Wright, supra note
18, at 4– 6, 50, 78–80.
67

See Bambara & Allen, supra note 48, at 75–101.

Acheson, supra note 27; Matt Kaufman, Blockchain, Cryptocurrency and Tokens: What Is
Wyoming Getting into and Does It Signal Where We Are Going?, Wyo. Law., Feb. 2019, at 14, 15.
68

Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. Law. 1, 3
(1995) (discussing Wyoming’s hand in the emergence of the LLC).
69

H.B. 19, 70, 101, 126, 64th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2018); S.F. 111, 64th Leg., Budget
Sess. (Wyo. 2018) (codified at scattered sections of Wyo. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§§ 40-22-102 to -110, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-105 (2018)).
70

71

See Temte, supra note 66.

72

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-12-101 to -103 (2021); id. § 17-4-206 (repealed Feb. 28, 2019).
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that are developed with insight from industry and interested parties,73 Wyoming
has offered a forward-looking structure to enable growth in the blockchain
sector.74 Wyoming also provides many other benefits to those seeking to utilize
blockchain technology.75
Current utilization of blockchain technology consumes a considerable
amount of energy,76 something that Wyoming is well-suited to accommodate.77
Likewise, Wyoming has organized a Blockchain Coalition (Coalition) to assist in
educating Wyomingites on the benefits blockchain promises.78 This Coalition is
on a commendable pursuit to help normalize blockchain technology and push for
its implementation throughout the state.79 Although not yet advocating directly
for the implementation of blockchain-enabled voting systems, the Coalition has
advocated for implementing this promising technology into governmental record
keeping and campaign management 80—both indirect and tangential to utilizing
the technology for voting.
Further still, the Wyoming Legislature has formed a Blockchain Task Force
(Task Force) to assist regulators in determining the best course forward in
regulating the blockchain field within the state.81 This Task Force has been charged
with introducing blockchain-related bills for the Legislature’s consideration.82
Having already advanced multiple first-of-their-kind bills that were passed
in 2018,83 the Task Force has not stopped forging forward in paving a model
regulatory system that other jurisdictions may adopt.84 Commentators have noted
how this new framework provides Wyoming with a unique opportunity to directly
influence how blockchain technology may be regulated beyond the state itself.85
See Matthew T. McClintock, Understanding Wyoming’s 2018 Blockchain Laws: A Model
for Industry Regulation, Wyo. Law., June 2018, at 40.
73

74

Id.

75

See Temte, supra note 66, at 91–93.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Id. at 93.

79

Id.

Wyoming Blockchain Coalition Announces Support for Blockchain in Wyoming, Bus.
Wire (Nov. 14, 2017, 11:55 AM), www.businesswire.com/news/home/20171114006317/en/
Wyoming-Blockchain-Coalition-Announces-Support-for-Blockchain-in-Wyoming [https://perma.
cc/7GMH-ZK2C].
80

81

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 28-11-701 (2021).

82

Id.

83

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

84

See Temte, supra note 66, at 43.

See id.; Caitlin Long, What Do Wyoming’s 13 New Blockchain Laws Mean?, Forbes
(Mar. 4, 2019, 7:29 AM), www.forbes.com/sites/caitlinlong/2019/03/04/what-do-wyomings-newblockchain-laws-mean/?sh=3b77b9d95fde.
85
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III. Voting Considerations
A. Implementing Voting Changes
Authority over election measures is split between the federal and state
governments.86 Directed by the United States Constitution, states are granted
control over multiple important aspects of the election of senators, representatives,
president, and vice president.87 In the case of the former two, the states have
control over the time, place, and manner in which these elections are held.88
The states also have broad authority to control the structure and procedures for
administering these elections.89 Still, the United States Constitution reserves the
right for Congress to alter state election systems “at any time by Law . . . except as
to the Places of choosing Senators.”90 The latter two elections—for the president
and vice president—finds authority in the Twelfth Amendment, which outlines
the process for such elections.91 The Electoral College is the process by which
these elections are determined.92 The states do, however, retain control over how
the members of the Electoral College are elected.93 Again, Congress maintains
a constitutionally reserved right to determine the time and day of general
elections, which are required to be uniform across all fifty states.94
In a limited number of instances, Congress has utilized its authority under
the Constitution to regulate the election systems in certain situations.95 These
situations have primarily been to remedy certain discriminatory practices
that were still being implemented after the abolishment of slavery.96 Further
enactments, such as the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, have attempted
to ease the process of registering to vote in America in an effort to increase voter
participation.97 Likewise, Congress has acted before to replace outdated voting
systems 98 and assist overseas voters.99 While these measures reflect Congress’s
86

Susskind, supra note 28, at 802– 03; U.S. Const. art. I, § 4; id. art. II, § 1.

87

Susskind, supra note 28, at 802– 03.

88

Id. at 803.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id. at 803–04.

96

Id.

97

Id.

Id. (citing Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145)).
98

99

Susskind, supra note 28, at 803– 04.
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willingness to take action to assist states in modernizing their voting systems, the
“most important voting rights bill since the passing of the Voting Rights Act in
1965” was passed in 2002 and remains largely unchanged.100
The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) made several changes to
state-administered federal elections, including the grant of federal funds to
states that modernize their voting equipment.101 This is incredibly important, as
technology has only continued to advance at increasingly faster paces.102 While
modernization is a primary goal of HAVA, states are also required to comply with
several requirements.103
First, the system must permit the voter to privately and independently
verify the selections the voter made before the ballot is cast as a vote.104 Second,
the voter must be provided with—again in a private and independent manner—
the opportunity to change or correct any error in the ballot before it is cast and
counted, including through a replacement ballot.105 Third, if a voter selects
more than one candidate for a single office, the voter must be notified before
the ballot is cast, and provided the opportunity to correct the ballot.106 Fourth,
the system must also provide a record with audit capacity.107 Fifth, accessibility
must be provided for individuals with disabilities while maintaining privacy.108
Sixth, alternative language accessibility must be supported on the system.109
Seventh, the system must comply with error rates no greater than those issued
by the Federal Election Commission on October 29, 2002.110 And finally, each
state must adopt uniform standards for what constitutes a vote and what will be
counted as a vote in each voting system used in the state.111
Under HAVA, a “voting system” is defined to include “the total combination
of mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic equipment (including the
software, firmware, and documentation required to program, control, and support
the equipment) that is used to define ballots, cast and count votes, report or display
100

Id. (quoting 147 Cong. Rec. H9290 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 2001) (statement of Rep. Lewis)).

101

Susskind, supra note 28, at 804 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 20901(b)(1)(F)).

De Filippi & Wright, supra note 18, at 156–58, 180 (discussing first Moore’s law, and
then the role that large mining pools have begun playing in blockchain ecosystems).
102

103

Id.

104

52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(1)(A)(i).

105

Id. § 21081(a)(1)(A)(ii).

106

Id. § 21081(a)(1)(A)(iii).

107

Id. § 21081(a)(2).

108

Id. § 21081(a)(3).

109

Id. § 21081(a)(4).

110

Id. § 21081(a)(5).

111

Id. § 21081(a)(6).
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election results, and to maintain and produce any audit trail information.”112
This also includes the practices and associated documentation used to test the
system, maintain records of system errors and defects, and make information
available to the voter.113
Notably, however, HAVA does not outline any specific voting systems that
are recommended or even permitted.114 Thus, new voting systems have flexibility
but must comply with these existing standards and the definition of a “voting
system” to be used in an election for federal office.115 The Election Assistance
Commission (EAC), established under HAVA, is an independent and bipartisan
federal agency that provides voluntary voting system guidelines and testing for a
national certification of the underlying hardware and software of voting systems.116
In support of this, the EAC adopted the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines,
originally a 228-page document, now with numerous additions, that provides
a set of requirements to meet this certification.117 Although generally voluntary,
many states—including Wyoming118—require EAC certification.119 Ensuring
EAC compliance is thus a primary concern in proposing and implementing a
new system.120
In addition to HAVA requirements, provisions of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 (VRA) are still important today.121 Considering these before adopting a
new voting system is therefore an important consideration.122 Of prominence is
the prohibition of minority vote dilution from Section 2 of the VRA.123 This
section of the VRA prohibits implementation of standards, practices, or
procedures that result in a denial or abridgement of the right of any United States
citizen to vote on account of race or color, or membership in a language minority
group.124 A violation may arise regardless of the intent of the state govern-

112

Id. § 21081(b)(1).

113

Id. § 21081(b)(2).

Id. § 21081 (referencing, however, direct-recording electronic voting machines, known
as DREs).
114

115

Id.

116

Id. § 20921-2.

117

Susskind, supra note 28, at 805–06.

118

Wyo. Code R. § 002-0005-12 (LexisNexis 2021).

119

Id.

120

Id.

121

Susskind, supra note 28, at 806.

122

Id.

123

Id.

124

Id.
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ment.125 Proving a violation only requires that the claimant shows that the
challenged voting procedure—based on the totality of the circumstances—has a
discriminatory effect.126
A facially neutral state voting standard, practice, or procedure may still be
challenged under voting dilution grounds if there is a discriminatory effect on
minority voters.127 Thus, a new voting system in Wyoming must fit within the
standards of HAVA, EAC, and the VRA.128 Even considering these complications,
a blockchain-enabled system as proposed in Part V provides promise to improve
Wyoming’s voting systems.

B. Wyoming Election Highlights
Elections are dealt with in Wyoming Statutes Title 22.129 Certain statutes
are directly relevant when considering implementing a blockchain-enabled
system in the state.130 One statute authorizes the board of county commissioners
of each county to adopt or use “any electronic voting system authorized by
law,” a promising authorizing statute when considering the implementation of
a blockchain-enabled voting system in Wyoming.131 Another relevant statute
is Wyoming Statute Section 22-2-121.132 This statute not only authorizes the
Secretary of State to issue directives and ensure compliance with how ballots are
to be transmitted electronically to Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee
Voting Act (UOCAVA) voters,133 but also provides authority for issuing directives
and ensuring compliance “when there is a declared natural disaster or other
impending or declared emergency which interferes with an election.”134
The majority of Wyoming’s Election Code deals with traditional in-person
voting completed on physical ballots.135 Similarly, Wyoming permits “any
125

Id.

126

Id.

127

Id.

128

See supra notes 61, 116, 118 and accompanying text.

129

Wyo. Stat. Ann. tit. 22.

See id. tit. 22, ch. 11 (setting forth the requirements and procedures for implementing and
utilizing electronic voting systems); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-102(a)(xiv) (2021) (defining “elec
tronic voting system”).
130

131

Id. § 22-11-102.

132

Id. § 22-2-121.

133

Id. § 22-2-121(e)(ii).

Id. § 22-2-121(f ); see Mark Gordon, Declaration of a State Emergency and a Public
Health Emergency, Exec. Order 2020-2, drive.google.com/file/d/19mX3feCje2NKRrKi_
GPiKvwcckGVoVBh/view [https://perma.cc/EW2Z-X8MQ] (declaring an emergency that may
have benefitted from having directives from the Secretary of State).
134

135

See generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. tit. 22.
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qualified elector” to vote absentee through mail-in voting on physical ballots.136
Thus, the possibility of implementing a blockchain-enabled voting system
primarily without physical ballots would seem farfetched.137 However, Part V of
this Comment explores how this future may become a reality more easily than
what first meets the eye.

C. Current Voting Measures
Currently, Wyoming utilizes paper ballots and automatic tabulating equip
ment that provides a paper record.138 However, due mainly to the failure to carry
out post-election audits, the State received a “C” grade by the Center for American
Progress.139 This failure is believed to leave the State open to undetected hacking
and other issues on election day.140 Wyoming also utilizes a controlled-access
electronic voter registration system.141 This system appears to meet many current
industry standards for both prevention and detection of errors and intrusions.142
While all ballots are accounted for at the precinct level, counties are not
explicitly required to compare and reconcile precinct totals with countywide
composite results.143 The State, to its credit, does require that vote tallies and
ballot reconciliation information be made public.144 Wyoming “did earn points”
for disallowing UOCAVA voters to submit their ballots electronically—requiring
submission of ballots by mail or by delivering them in person.145 The blockchainenabled system proposed in Part V of this Comment would permit electronically
submitted ballots to undergo precinct and countywide reconciliation which
would allow for an integrated and hierarchal system.146

136

Id. § 22-9-101.

137

But see id. § 22-11-104 (2021) (providing an exception to the physical ballot constraints).

Danielle Root et al., Election Security in All 50 States: Defending America’s
Elections, Ctr. for Am. Progress 194–96 (2018), cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/
2018/02/21105338/020118_ElectionSecurity-report11.pdf#page=197 [https://perma.cc/K34DQS7D]; 2018 EAVS Data Brief: Wyoming, Election Assistance Comm’n (Dec. 17, 2020),
www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/EAVS_2018_Data_Brief_WY.pdf [https://perma.
cc/328Y-Q4RF].
138

139

Root et al., supra note 138, at 194.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id.

143

Id.

144

Id.

Root et al., supra note 138, at 194. But see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-9-109 (2021)
(permitting UOCAVA ballots to be provided in an electronic format).
145

Agnes Beatrice Gambill, The Future of Voting Reform with Blockchain Technology, 56
Idaho L. Rev. 167, 174 (2020). This “would foster electoral integrity and streamline electoral
management in state and local government.” Id.
146
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Additionally, Wyoming has previously used and currently uses hardware
and software from ES&S, the company that provides the majority of the voting
systems throughout the country.147 Removing such a centralized provider is
one of the prime benefits of a blockchain-enabled system.148 The decentralized
nature of blockchain technology improves the security of the system by removing
one central target to attack. ES&S is one central target, making a variety of
attacks much simpler. While newer products from this provider utilize air-gap149
security measures, they all come from one central source, perhaps a target of
future election interference.150
Other than implementing new voting systems from ES&S, Wyoming made
no significant changes to the primary election that took place on November 3,
2020 amidst a worldwide pandemic.151 However, moving forward, implementing
a blockchain-enabled system would allow voters to vote from home more
easily during turbulent circumstances. Still, an apparent issue with Wyoming’s
current voting system appears to be the voter registration process.152 Although
Wyoming allows for same-day registration at the polls,153 this policy might be a
hold-up for implementing new, more efficient procedures for voters to register
ahead of time.154
In a report from the Secretary of State, Wyoming received a significant sum
of funding from the HAVA Grant Program to “improve the administration of
elections for Federal office . . . .”155 Nearly a third of this funding is being used to
identify and address cyber vulnerabilities within the State’s system.156 Half of the
grant is set aside for improving the voter registration system, specifically citing
147

Wyoming Chooses ES&S Paper-Based Technology, supra note 26.

148

See generally De Filippi & Wright, supra note 18.

Sunoo Park et al., Going From Bad to Worse: From Internet Voting to Blockchain Voting,
MIT at 6, n.13 (Nov. 6, 2020), people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/PSNR20.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TB2K-EHXB] (“Air-gapping means maintaining a device disconnected from the Internet and from
any internet-connected device.”).
149

See Wyoming Chooses ES&S Paper-Based Technology, supra note 26; Susskind, supra note 28,
at 798–800.
150

Wyoming Takes Meek Steps to Increase Mail-in Voting in 2020. It Should Be Doing More.,
Better Wyo. (June 10, 2020), betterwyo.org/2020/06/10/wyoming-takes-meek-steps-to-increasemail-in-voting-in-2020-it-should-be-doing-more/ [https://perma.cc/3CF5-E3M5] [hereinafter
Wyoming Takes Meek Steps].
151

152

Id.; see also Susskind, supra note 28, at 805–06.

153

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-104 (2021).

See Wyoming Takes Meek Steps, supra note 151 (claiming that “in Wyoming, it’s a pain in the
ass to register to vote if you don’t register at the polls”).
154

155
Edward A. Buchanan, 2020 Help America Vote Act (HAVA) Election Security
Grant Program Narrative Wyoming Secretary of State 1, www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/
paymentgrants/narrative2020/WY_20ES_Program_Narrative.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6D7-GZDE].
156

Id.
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data encryption and secure functionality157—both aspects of the system that a
blockchain-enabled system could help to ensure.158 Even if these current funds are
not utilized in implementing a blockchain-enabled system, future funds should
be considered for use in developing such a system.

IV. Blockchain Voting Measures
A. Current Blockchain Voting
Current blockchain-enabled voting measures have been seen in multiple
markets in the United States: the city of Denver, Utah County, Utah, and
the state of West Virginia among them.159 The overseer and provider of these
services has thus far been one company: Voatz.160 The success of these “pilots” has
been questionable.161
This system requires the voter to register as an absentee voter and choose
to vote mobile on their application.162 The Voatz system—the private system
receiving the most spotlight in the arena—implements cellphone-enabled
biometric authentication matched to government IDs, a methodology which
is certainly appealing.163 Once successfully registered to vote by mobile means,
Voatz first requires users to scan an original government issued identification—a
driver’s license, state ID, or passport.164 Voters also use the camera on their
device to take a live snapshot of their face.165 Then, either the facial recognition
technology or the fingerprint reader on the voter’s mobile device is used to link
their identity from the identification provided, to that specific device.166 The voter

157

Id.

See generally United States Patent Application Publication No: US 2020/0258338
A1 (Aug. 13, 2020), patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/41/07/09/647d1fa20703ac/
US20200258338A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9E7W-DWZD] [hereinafter Patent Application].
158

159

Voatz, supra note 10.

160

Id.

Matthew De Silva, The FBI Is Investigating West Virginia’s Blockchain-Based Midterm
Elections, Quartz (Oct. 9, 2019), qz.com/1574671/the-fbi-is-investigating-west-virginiasblockchain-based-midterm-elections/ [https://perma.cc/YS3T-KJC9].
161

162

Voatz, supra note 10 (click on “Menu”; then select “How It Works”).

Danny Nelson, Overstock Touts Voatz Blockchain Voting App as Solution to US Election
Fracas, CoinDesk (Oct. 30, 2020, 12:30 PM), www.coindesk.com/blockchain-voting-us-electionproblems [https://perma.cc/TWC3-9H9A]; see supra note 10 (discussing using “smartphone
security, remote identity verification, biometrics and blockchain” to secure votes).
163

164

Voatz, supra note 10.

165

Id.

166

Id.
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may then simply submit their ballot electronically.167 This submission reaches
the election officials who are able to print the ballot selections to create a paper
trail for an audit that can be used to check against the blockchain database that
supports the system.168
Voatz maintains that all personally identifiable information—verified through
a separate company—is immediately deleted.169 However, Voatz has previously
received negative feedback for storing voter’s information on private servers.170
This raises both privacy concerns in general and implicates issues regarding the
HAVA standards.171
Regardless of the above concerns, this initial foray into blockchain-enabled
voting in the United States is promising for those that may follow.172 Evidencing
not only an interest and a willingness to adopt a blockchain-enabled system,
these initial use cases also provide guidance into potential issues to be addressed
with future blockchain-enabled voting systems.173 Facing backlash from two
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) studies,174 Voatz—or a similarly
implemented private party system—is likely not the answer moving forward.
Utilizing a platform that has been demonstrated to be susceptible to attacks is
not the step forward in protecting the American vote. Likewise, widespread use of
a single company’s product hampers the decentralized benefit of the blockchain
technology itself.

B. Hopefully Government-Led, Not Private
A government-led system may be a much more favorable option.175 Meeting
HAVA and EAC standards will be crucial in providing a workable blockchainenabled solution to voting.176 With state and federal funding to update voting
system infrastructure, Wyoming could lead the wave in adopting a framework
for such a system.177 Already the home to blockchain acceptance and regulation,
Wyoming could continue this dominance by establishing a superior voting

167

Id.

168

Id.

169

Id.

170

Specter et al., supra note 23, at 12–13.

171

See supra Part III.

172

See Wolfson, supra note 23.

173

See id.

174

See generally Specter et al., supra note 23; Park et al., supra note 149.

175

See generally Susskind, supra note 28.

176

See supra Part III.

177

McClintock, supra note 73, at 40; Long, supra note 85.
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system for its citizens.178 Establishing a promising, practical, and sound solution
would likely lead to adoption among other states, just as Wyoming has seen
through LLCs as well as other blockchain measures.179 Hopefully, this will lead to
nationwide adoption of blockchain initiatives as well.
Having an integrated and government-backed solution could not only
provide a further layer of trust and integrity, but also a sense of legitimacy that
a private party system may lack.180 With more—and direct—oversight by the
administering government, the system could be subject to security clearances
and greater transparency. With Congress already beginning to take note of the
potential that blockchain provides,181 such widespread and federally backed
adoption may not be too far outside of the bounds of reality. Indeed, the
United States Postal Service (USPS) has already received a provisional patent for
implementing exactly this.182

C. What Does This Look Like?
Questions certainly still remain for what exactly such a system would look
like but analyzing the USPS’s approach may give light to a functional solution.183
Although different than the solution being implemented by Voatz, the
USPS’s provisional patent provides multiple likely “embodiments”184 of the
system envisioned by this Comment. The “summary”185 of the patent provides a
high-level discussion of a system utilizing the current security of the USPS and
physically-mailed ballots, tied in with the security and verifiability of a blockchain-

178
See generally Acheson, supra note 27; Gregory Barber, The Newest Haven for Cryptocurrency
Companies? Wyoming, Wired (June 13, 2019, 7:00 AM), www.wired.com/story/newest-havencryptocurrency-companies-wyoming/ [https://perma.cc/6Y5Y-XRZW].
179

Long, supra note 85.

180

See generally Norden & Beard, supra note 25.

181

See generally Patent Application, supra note 158.

182

Id.

183

Id. The patent itself has several prospective versions of a blockchain-enabled voting system.

See 37 C.F.R. § 1.71 (2021); Specific Embodiment of Invention, 13A Fed. Proc. Forms
§ 52:94. The “embodiments” of a patent are likely manners of implementing the process, machine,
manufacture, composition of matter, or improvement thereof. While the patent specification need
not describe every embodiment, many patents include various embodiments.
184

185
37 C.F.R. § 1.73 (“A brief summary of the invention indicating its nature and substance,
which may include a statement of the object of the invention, should precede the detailed
description. Such summary should, when set forth, be commensurate with the invention as claimed
and any object recited should be that of the invention as claimed.”).
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enabled system.186 This federal approach likewise highlights the desirability of
such a system for voters generally.187
The USPS patent outlines a blockchain-enabled voting system that would
be supported by two separate databases, utilizing electronic signatures and
coded ballots to enable mobile voting capability.188 Such a system would ensure
anonymity by separating the digital voter identification from the associated vote.189
The envisioned system(s) would employ the “dependability and security” of the
USPS to incorporate a blockchain-enabled voting system “to prevent tampering
or modification of electronic voting results.”190
The detailed description of the patent envisions using a blockchainenabled system to “defeat fraud” through the “cryptographic functions”
inherent in blockchain technology that “prevent bad actors from altering the
blockchain.”191 Further, such a system would allow voters, election officials, and
auditors to ensure that the votes were received and properly counted—one of the
main benefits of a blockchain-enabled system.192
The mechanics of such a system vary slightly in each embodiment envisioned, but most relevant to this Comment is the embodiment which enables
mobile voting. This patent proposes a system in which a template ballot would be
created by an election official.193 Voters wishing to vote with their mobile device
would then be able to apply to a system that would allow them to request an
absentee ballot and verify their identity.194 The system would verify the identity
of the voter and create a “pseudo-anonymous token in the form of a unique
identifier that represents the voter.”195 A paper ballot is then generated with a
form of computer or machine readable identifier that represents this unique token

Patent Application, supra note 158, at 32 (“Voters generally wish to be able to vote
for elected officials or on other issues in a manner that is convenient and secure. Further, those
holding elections wish to be able to ensure that election results have not been tampered with and
that the results actually correspond to the votes that were cast. In some embodiments, a blockchain
allows the tracking of the various types of necessary data in a way that is secure and allows others
to easily confirm that data has not been altered.”).
186

187

Id.

188

See id.

189

Id.

190

Id. at 33.

191

Id. at 34.

192

Id.

193

Id. at 33.

194

Id.

195

Id.
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while “obscuring the identification information of the voter.”196 This paper ballot
is then mailed to the voter, and once received, the voter can use a mobile device
or computer to scan the ballot with a camera.197 Once scanned, the voter is able
to cast a digital vote which is written onto the blockchain.198
Beyond this, such a system could have tremendous flexibility and room to
adapt to specific considerations of each jurisdiction.199 Some of these considerations
could be how the voter registers, receives the ballot, and how the cast ballots are
tabulated.200 However, meeting HAVA and even EAC basics is crucial.201

D. Pros vs. Cons
While the broad realm of internet voting has received plenty of flack,202 there
has yet to be nearly as much discourse on blockchain-enabled voting systems
specifically. Some of the benefits that are believed to be experienced would not
only meet legal standards but improve on them.203 With a system that could be
more secure, mobile, transparent, and verifiable,204 Wyoming has the opportunity
to enhance its citizens’ participation in their democracy. Although these benefits
have certainly been disputed,205 so too have each iteration of voting systems.206
Although the attacks on democracy seem ever more constant, this only increases
the need for change.207
A blockchain-enabled system could bring access to voting for those that
traditional methods may not work for.208 Further, supporting voting records
on a blockchain system could lend credence to the election system through the
196

Id. at 33, 39.

197

Id. at 33.

198

Id.

199

Id.

200

Id. at 33, 35–36, 44.

201

See supra Part III.

E.g., Simons, supra note 31, at 544–48; Andrew W. Appel & Philip B. Stark, EvidenceBased Elections: Create A Meaningful Paper Trail, Then Audit, 4 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 523, 529 (2020).
202

203

Susskind, supra note 28, at 806 –10.

204

See supra Part II.

205

See generally Simons, supra note 31, at 545–48, 552–57.

See Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73
Fordham L. Rev. 1711, 1717–24 (2005) (providing a history of various voting mechanisms and
issues that each has faced).
206

Select Committee on Intelligence, 116th Cong., Report on Russian Active
Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, at 3–5, 10, 54–66 (2019),
www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
RQ5A-ZU8N].
207

208

Susskind, supra note 28, at 808–10.
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immutable nature of the blockchain.209 Unlike the 2020 election year, a system
implementing blockchain records could store and report voting counts much
faster than the current hand-count system.210 With an automatic tally that can
be publicly disclosed after the fact, election officials will be able to simply add
the digital votes to the votes cast otherwise.211 As more and more votes are cast
digitally, the overall process of counting ballots will become far easier. Such a
system could be designed for ballot choices to be verified before the ballot is cast
and designed to permit verification that the vote was recorded—both of which
could be done by each voter.212 Recording votes onto a blockchain allows for an
easily accessible method for a voter to audit their respective vote.213 Currently,
once a voter casts a ballot, the voter must place their trust in the election system
that that vote will be counted—and counted properly.214
Even critics are faced with having to explain away some of the benefits
sought and promised by a blockchain-enabled system.215 Perhaps the biggest
benefit of a blockchain voting system is simply the fact that voters would not
be voting solely on the current voting systems. Many of the systems used in the
2020 election cycle—including in Wyoming—appear to be deficient in some
regards.216 Issues have routinely arisen among current providers of voting systems,
and the expensive machines are not frequently updated.217 Allowing voters to
utilize a blockchain-enabled system would permit voters to vote more easily while
being assured of the security of doing so.218
However, not everybody is on board for implementing a blockchain-enabled
voting system for governmental elections.219 Even leading authorities in the

209

at 32.

See De Filippi & Wright, supra note 18, at 37–38; Patent Application, supra note 158,

210
Brianna Bogucki, Buying Votes in the 21st Century: The Potential Use of Bitcoins and Blockchain
Technology in Electronic Voting Reform, 17 Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 59, 75 (2017).
211

Patent Application, supra note 158, at 32–34.

212

Id.

213

Id. at 34.

214

Susskind, supra note 28, at 793–95.

215

See Simons, supra note 31, at 550–55.

Which Voting Machines Are Used and How Are They Compromised?, Wyo. Liberty Grp.
(Aug. 16, 2020), wyliberty.org/blog/election-security-standards/which-voting-machines-are-usedand-how-they-are-compromised [https://perma.cc/X3UU-B6FF].
216

217
Simons, supra note 31, at 552; see Ben Popken, Voting Machine Makers Face Questions from
House Lawmakers — but More Remain, NBCNews (Jan. 9, 2020, 12:12 PM), www.nbcnews.com/
tech/security/voting-machine-makers-face-questions-house-lawmakers-more-remain-n1113181
[https://perma.cc/4DKZ-HJUM]; Which Voting Machines Are Used and How Are They Compromised?,
supra note 216.
218

Patent Application, supra note 158, at 33.

219

Simons, supra note 31, at 555– 63.
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area choose not to utilize or advocate for the use of blockchain-enabled voting
systems.220 Primary concerns of these experts include security,221 legal concerns
(double-voters, transparency, stolen votes),222 and more tangible concerns such as
energy use and cost.223
Some of the discussion spawned from an understanding of blockchainenabled voting systems other than the one proposed by the USPS.224 With the
fear of Russian hackers bubbling near the surface of the public conscious,225
meeting the “twin goals of anonymity and verifiability” are often questioned.226
Although the ability for voters to verify that their votes were counted correctly
is not required—as anonymity is 227—this is one of the primary benefits of
implementing a blockchain-enabled system.228 Pairing current hacking concerns
with concerns that may be spawned by a digital voting system, the ability for a
voter to access the blockchain and verify that their vote has been properly counted
is important.
Much of the concern for digital voting can be summarized by an old cartoon:
“On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.”229 This line of thinking highlights
the concern that a digital voting system would be accessible by anyone—regardless
of their status as a voter or even a citizen. While the discussion on this base level
concern is certainly valid, it appears to assume a system that lacks a sufficient form

220
Lucas Mearian, Why Blockchain-Based Voting Could Threaten Democracy, Computerworld
(Aug. 12, 2019, 3:00 AM), www.computerworld.com/article/3430697/why-blockchain-could-bea-threat-to-democracy.html [https://perma.cc/3BZ5-6ULT].
221

Id.

222

See generally Specter et al., supra note 23, at 1–2, 14–15; Park et al., supra note 149, at

1–3, 7.
223

Temte, supra note 66, at 92 n.42.

See generally Simons, supra note 31. This article discusses many different systems but does
not delve into the end-to-end verifiability and registration methods that seem to be proposed in
systems such as the USPS’s. See generally Patent Application, supra note 158. Such measures may
ameliorate many critics concerns. See Park et al., supra note 149, at 9–10 (discussing how end-to-end
verifiability may assist in overcoming many of the concerns in implementing a blockchain-enabled
voting system).
224

225

Select Committee on Intelligence, supra note 207, passim.

Simons, supra note 31, at 544 (“[T]he secret ballot makes it impossible for the voter to
verify her ballot.”). The note associated with this does recognize that some systems propose manners
to address this, but asserts that nothing capable of such currently exists. Id. at n.2.
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of registration. The proposed system’s registration would likely include receiving
a private key to empower the voter to digitally cast their vote, while ensuring
voter-eligibility and preventing double-voter concerns.230 Such a system could
likewise address many of the security concerns as a permissioned blockchain
limits participation to those verified, while providing a level of the decentralized,
transparent security benefits of a blockchain.231
A permissioned—otherwise known as private—blockchain only permits
authorized parties to view or add to the blockchain.232 Such systems have a
variety of permissions that may be granted or retained, and leaves a consortium
of users in control of the blockchain.233 This has been referred to as a “permission
continuum” which permits many different permutations for various situations.234
The blockchain-enabled voting system advocated for in this Comment would
exist under a consortium of governmental bodies exercising appropriate control
over the blockchain and only permitting voting access to those properly registered
in a manner similar to that envisioned by the USPS patent.235
Critics have concerns about how a blockchain voting system would fit within
the current voting laws and if a blockchain voting system could ever comply with
these laws.236 Questions about anonymity and accessibility reign supreme in this
arena but might be met through various cryptographic methods, as addressed
in Part II.
While concerns certainly abound, many seem to lack significant weight when
addressed by choosing an appropriate system.237 Although no system is without
flaw or fail, a blockchain-enabled voting system may offer voters with substantially
improved voting experiences and security.238 Even the EAC has stated so before.239
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231
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E. Examples of Voting Systems Using Blockchain Technology
As 2020 becomes more of a memory and less of a reality, there are more
examples of blockchain-enabled voting systems being used both nationally and
internationally.240 While most of the United States has yet to implement such a
system, a select few jurisdictions have begun testing these systems out.241 A few
steps ahead of the game, Estonia has been utilizing a form of blockchain-enabled
voting since 2007.242
Estonia’s system is unique in that it utilizes a PIN and personal sim card
in order for an Estonian to be able to cast their vote.243 This approach helps
to ameliorate the concern with registration and non-citizen voters, but also
complicates the process and leaves open the potential for another individual to
utilize the same hardware to cast the original voter’s ballot.244 Other European
countries have dipped their toes into the water, but most have either decided
against implementing a blockchain-enabled system or are planning to wait for
further developments.245 One such example is the city of Naples, Italy.246 After
a brief foray into the new technology, concerns over voters being influenced or
suppressed appear to have killed the project.247
Closer to home, Denver, Colorado has been toying with the idea of
blockchain-enabled voting.248 Testing out the Voatz system in its May 2019
election, the city officials behind the project were pleased with the outcome.249
Still, this pilot project was fully funded by Tusk Philanthropies and only

240

See, e.g., Simons, supra note 31, at 548–50, 558–60.

241

See supra Part IV.

242

Simons, supra note 31, at 549–50.

E-Governance, E-Estonia, e-estonia.com/solutions/e-governance/i-voting/ [https://perma.
cc/P3UC-DFXC]; see also Sydney Lauren Abualy, Note, “Estonia’s Gift to the World”: The Imple
mentation of A Blockchain Protocol for Corporate Governance in New York, 14 Brook. J. Corp. Fin.
& Com. L. 275, 277 (2020).
243

Electronic Voting with Blockchain: An Experience from Naples, Italy, Cointelegraph (Feb.
3, 2020), cointelegraph.com/news/electronic-voting-with-blockchain-an-experience-from-naplesitaly [https://perma.cc/PN4P-TMNT] (discussing critical issues that the Estonian voting system
had encountered).
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See Jeanne Davant, NCC Completes Audit for Denver’s Mobile Voting Pilot, The Colo.
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implemented for UOCAVA voters.250 Likewise, Utah County, Utah has attempted
to join the early adopters in the blockchain-enabled voting sphere.251
Using the same company as Denver and West Virginia, the state of Utah has
seemingly jumped ahead in the race to fully implement a blockchain-enabled
voting system.252 Furthermore, the federal government seems to be actively
investigating and seeking to implement such systems.253 With increasing attacks
focused on governmental agencies and services, the federal government has a
strong interest in working to protect the voice of the voters.254 While a federal
solution would be significant, Wyoming has the chance to direct how such a
system would operate and be implemented.255

V. Legal Analysis
To perform this legal analysis, this Comment incorporates various aspects
of multiple systems, such as the USPS proposed system(s), those discussed by
MIT, and portions of the Voatz system—systems which have been discussed
above.256 Starting with HAVA, it is clear that a blockchain-enabled system would
be beneficial to implement.
The first HAVA requirement of private and independent verification of
selections is an easy task for an electronic, blockchain-enabled system.257 By
providing a verification screen after the voter inputs their selections, such a
system will be able to meet this requirement in much the same ways as current
direct-recording electronic voting machines do.258 With a mobile, electronic
interface, voters will be able to review their selections before casting their ballot.
The second requirement of HAVA requires that the voter must be provided with
the opportunity to change or correct any error in the ballot before it is cast and
counted,259 which is likewise easily met.
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Philanthropies, mobilevoting.org/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2021) [https://perma.cc/RRV9-5CET].
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Providing the voter with an opportunity to change or correct an error in the
ballot before it has been cast and counted is easier on an electronic system.260
Rather than changing a paper-based selection—or completing a wholly new
ballot—the electronic nature of the system could easily allow a pre-cast change.261
This is similar to the third requirement presented by HAVA, ensuring that only
one candidate is selected for each office.262 If a voter has selected more than one
candidate for a single office, the electronic system would easily be able to notify
the voter before the voter casts their ballot—even preventing the voter from
casting the ballot only one candidate is selected for each office—and allow for
a correction.263
Each voter would also be able to audit their own vote.264 However, this is
not enough.265 Any blockchain-enabled voting system would also be required to
produce a “permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity,” per the fourth
requirement of HAVA.266
To satisfy the fifth requirement—requiring accessibility for individuals with
disabilities while maintaining privacy—the system would need to have different
technologically enabled methods of voting for those with disabilities.267 Utilizing
current accessibility settings and tools on electronic devices would satisfy this
requirement, and likely be better than that which is already used.268 Not only can
a digital approach generally lend credence to accessibility,269 but a system that
can be utilized through voters’ current accessibility-enabled technology may even
assist these voters better than the current voting systems.270 This similarly would
be able to be utilized in complying with HAVA’s sixth requirement, alternative
language accessibility.271 Again, a mobile-based voting system could quite easily
implement alternative languages through the electronic platform.272
260
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See Voatz, supra note 10. While Voatz does not appear to expressly discuss supporting
alternative language accessibility, the company does claim compliance with EAC Voluntary
Voting System Guidelines (VVSG v1.1). Id. These guidelines make clear that such accessibility
is a requirement under section 203 of the VRA. Voluntary Voting System Guidelines, Election Assistance Comm’n 4, 48–83 (2015), www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/
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The seventh HAVA requirement mandates that State-provided voting systems
comply with error rates that are no greater than those issued by the Federal
Election Commission.273 This seventh requirement is an area which would likely
be well improved by a blockchain-enabled voting system.274 Utilizing a secure and
advanced electronic system is expected to provide greater accuracy.275
Finally, the eighth requirement of HAVA would also be met by a blockchainenabled system. This last requirement has charged States to adopt uniform
standards for what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote in each
voting system used in the state.276 Simple revisions—or at least clarifications—to
existing voting laws would ensure ballots cast on a blockchain-enabled voting
system meet a uniform standard.277
Wyoming’s Election Code does not directly define what constitutes a
“vote.”278 However, the EAC voluntary guidelines define a “valid vote” as being
“from a ballot or ballot image that is legally acceptable according to state law.”279
In Wyoming, a “ballot” is defined as “the cardboard, paper or other material
upon which a voter marks his votes.”280 Still, the definition of “electronic voting
system” seems to permit recording, tabulating, and counting of non-physical
votes.281 Even still, the definition for a “voting device” is constrained to those
devices or methods that record votes on ballots.282 Therefore, while the proposed
system might have some legal validity, clarifications should be made to include
votes cast on an electronic ballot from a blockchain-enabled system.
Ensuring the “privacy of the voter and the confidentiality of the ballot”283
becomes a more interesting discussion. While blockchains in general are known
for near-anonymous interactions in many instances,284 this is complicated
to implement as a voting system considering the “twin goals of anonymity
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and verifiability.”285 However, such systems can be possible.286 Using several
cryptographic methods, a blockchain-enabled voting system could be structured to ensure a secret ballot while simultaneously being verifiable to the
voter.287 Not only does this meet the general requirement of a secret ballot
found throughout HAVA,288 but it also promotes election confidence through
voter verification.
Lastly, “the [VRA] ‘must be considered before altering state voting
systems.’”289 As discussed in Part III, a violation of the VRA may arise regardless
of intent, as long as the claimant shows that the altered standards, practices,
or procedures result in a discriminatory effect.290 Such a “claim could only be
successful, however, if blockchain voting became the only voting system in
America.”291 Like previous changes to existing voting standards, a blockchainenabled system would be in addition to current voting systems and standards,
not an immediate complete replacement.292 Additionally, with the increase of
internet access through both personal devices and free public institutions, a vote
dilution claim would be difficult to sustain.293

VI. Proposal
While the Wyoming Legislature should certainly work with the Task Force
and the Coalition on any future legislation in the blockchain realm, special focus
should be given to those who have begun developing and implementing such
systems—especially in the neighboring states of Colorado and Utah.294 However,
both of these early adopters are utilizing the contentious Voatz platform.295

285

Simons, supra note 31, at 544.

286

Specter et al., supra note 23, at 3.

287

Id.

See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (requiring that the first two HAVA requirements
be provided in a “private and independent manner”); id. § 21081(a)(1)(C) (“The voting system shall
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Monitoring other adopters will help to prevent avoidable errors, but these
observations should be qualified with their use of Voatz.
To the extent that the current election laws do not prevent the adoption of
a blockchain-enabled system, the Wyoming Legislature should declare a legislative finding that such a system may be adopted throughout the state.296 Similarly,
the Secretary of State should implement new regulations permitting the use of a
blockchain-enabled voting system under the existing authorizing statute.297 In
the instances that current language may prevent successful adoption of such a
system, the Wyoming Legislature should again work with the Task Force and
the Coalition to implement industry-compliant and enforceable language.298
A handful of statutes stand out as needing either clarification or expansion to be
able to clearly authorize the use of a blockchain-enabled system.299

VII. Conclusion
Providing the Wyoming voting public with an accessible, secure, and
electronic voting system enabled by a government-led blockchain will improve
Wyoming’s elections and allow for a functional democracy to continue even
amidst another pandemic.300 By meeting HAVA, EAC, and VRA standards,
the system will comply with existing legal safeguards while surpassing current
expectations that Americans have for present-day systems.301 Enabling access
to democracy through a blockchain-enabled system will renew a sense of trust
through a trustless, secure system to perform elections on.302
Benefitting the public through an array of unexpected potential futures, a
blockchain system could run an election through another worldwide pandemic,
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while voters are absent or unable to complete traditional ballots, and potentially
even through a nuclear attack.303 If nothing else, a blockchain-enabled voting
system will certainly strike up discussion around the dinner table during
the holidays.304

See Troy & Epstein, supra note 300; De Filippi & Wright, supra note 18, at 13. The Rand
Corporation sought a computer technology capable of withstanding a nuclear catastrophe. Id. This
led to the internet. Id. Blockchain functions in some similar ways to the internet and would likely
survive such catastrophe as well due to its decentralized nature. See id. at 13, 22.
303
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